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Abstract—In this paper we present an abstract replication
of institutional emergence patterns observed in common pool
resource (CPR) problems. We used the ADICO grammar of
institutions as the basic structure to model both agents’ strate-
gies and institutions. Through an evolutionary process, agents
modify their behaviours and eventually establish a management
institution for their CPR system, leading to significant benefits
both for them and for the commons as a whole. We showed that,
even if our model has a high level of abstraction, by taking an
evolutionary perspective and using the ADICO structure we are
able to observe common institutional patterns. We confirm that
institutions do indeed contribute to the sustainable management
of common pool resource systems.
Keywords: Common pool resource, institutions, norm,
emergence, evolutionary modelling
I. INTRODUCTION
Four decades of research have shown that Hardin’s Tragedy
of the Commons [5], although frequently occurring in open
access resources, can be avoided thanks to the building
of carefully-designed endogenous institutions [1], [12], [13].
However, the specific processes leading to institutional change
are often difficult to study in the field due to the large number
of factors potentially involved, and because such processes
often occur on temporal scales beyond the scope of most social
science research [18]. Laboratory experiments may offer a way
out of the problem, and they indeed significantly contribute to
our understanding of the dynamics of common-pool resource
(CPR) situations [14]. Nevertheless, the number and nature
of factors that can be reasonably tested in the lab is limited.
For instance, it is difficult to design experiments involving
long-term interactions among participants or doing studies
needing large samples of subjects. For these reasons, the
development of commons management institutions needs also
research going beyond what is reasonably to achieve in the
lab or in the field.
Agent-based models (ABM) represent an interesting alter-
native to both methods. Their main advantage is that they
allow to design virtual experiments using more flexible set
of conditions than what is feasible in the lab and to analyse
their long term dynamics more easily than what is possible in
the field [2], [18]. Using ABMs, it is indeed possible to design
complex models that are able to capture the effect of a large
number of factors on CPR management. The outcomes may
be subsequently compared with empirical findings to test the
models ability to reproduce patterns and dynamics observed
in the real world [8], [19], [21].
In this work, we present an ABM designed to replicate
patterns of institutional emergence commonly observed in
the field. It is based on the “grammar of institutions”, first
introduced by Crawford and Ostrom [3], and takes an implicit
evolutionary approach to explain the dynamics of CPR man-
agement institutions as emerging from the beliefs and actions
of users. This is in line with what we have learned from both
commons research, including Ostrom’s work [12], [13], [16],
and institutional economics, with a specific reference to North
[10], [11].
In our model, agents representing CPR users are endowed
with a set of behavioural strategies based on the ADICO
grammar [3], but can also learn by copying others or by
exploring new possibilities. Moreover, when unsatisfied with
the current state of affairs, they can engage in collective
action in order to collectively manage their resource through
an institution defined as an ADICO rule. Although in the
first phases of its development, the current model is already
able to replicate common dynamics of institutional emergence
and allows us to reach a better understanding of the process
underlying the development of CPR management institutions.
The structure of this paper is as follows. Section II intro-
duces the definition of institutions that will be used in the
paper and provides background on common pool resource
management problems. Section III defines our ABM allowing
the emergence of institutions for CPR management. Section
IV discusses simulation results. Finally, Section V gives the
concluding remarks.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Common-Pool Resource Systems
Common-pool resources are natural or man-made resources
shared among different users [12]. This produces competition
that often (although not necessarily) leads to their degradation
or even to destruction. Many natural resources fall in this
category and are today “chronically” overused. Examples
are forests, fisheries, water basins, biodiversity and even the
atmosphere.
Formally, the expression common-pool resource refers to
a class of goods defined by two characteristics: a difficult
excludability of potential beneficiaries and a high degree of
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subtractability (i.e., rivalry of consumption) [16]. Thus, the
CPRs share characters with both private and public goods,
namely a high subtractability with the former ones and a low
possibility of exclusion with the latter ones. This makes the
management of CPRs especially complex: as in the private
good case, the consumption of resource units (e.g., extraction
of timber from a forest, of water from a basin, etc.) by one
user reduces the total quantity of units available to the other
ones; as in the public good case, it is difficult to prevent any
user from continuing to subtract units from an endangered
resource (e.g. the ocean fisheries). This led Hardin to picture
the commons problem as a social dilemma in his famous
article The Tragedy of the Commons [5]. Formally, this can
be seen as a n players version of the Prisoner’s dilemma or,
more properly, as a CPR game, as first proposed by Walker and
colleagues [22]. In both cases, no user has rational incentives
to limit his/her consumption and, hence, the possibility to
avoid the resource degradation or destruction is extremely low.
Subsequent authors followed Hardin in presenting CPR
management as a social dilemma and in formalizing it using
different variations of the games above [4], [16]. These all
share the idea that the rational equilibrium of the game is
well below the collective optimum theoretically achievable by
restricting resource use to a sustainable level. Nevertheless,
in contrast with theoretical predictions, empirical research
has shown that successful management of the resources can
be achieved by building endogenous institutions [1]. More
specifically, the “tragedy” is avoided thanks to institutions that
define clear exploitation rights and create incentives to prevent
resource overuse. In other words, the tragedy of the commons
is the tragedy of open-access resources, not necessarily of well
managed CPRs.
Being institutional building the main way out of the
dilemma, the question becomes how to favour this process.
Empirical research trying to answer this question has been
summarized in Ostrom’s “diagnostic approach” [15], which
includes a large number of factors potentially affecting the out-
come of interaction in CPRs situations. Nevertheless, selecting
which factors are actually relevant in a given situation remains
a non-trivial task. What is still missing in guiding this choice
is a clearer picture of the mechanisms behind the emergence of
institutions in CPR situation. ABMs represent an appropriate
tool for this endeavour thanks to their capacity of linking the
micro and macro-levels of social behaviour [6], [21]. However,
a rigorous characterization of institutions becomes crucial to
fully exploit the analytical capacity of these models.
B. Institutions
In economics, institutions are usually defined as “the set of
rules actually used by a set of individuals to organize repetitive
activities that produce outcomes affecting those individuals
and potentially affecting others” [10].
Institutions enable interactions, provide stability, certainty,
and form the basis for trust. They may however, keep people
stuck in unsustainable behaviours or lead to biased power
relations. If institutions fail to fulfil stability or to enable sus-
tainable decisions, there are grounds for institutional (re)design
[9], [13].
Institutional (re)design refers to the devising of new social
arrangements, by examining existing arrangements and chang-
ing them if necessary [17]. In order to design institutions,
one should be able to understand and analyse the institutional
rules. Similarly, institutional frameworks such as Ostrom’s
Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework were
developed to study institutional change on the basis of a
systematic analysis of the different components of a socio-
ecological, system and their relations [13].
The IAD decomposition of a social-ecological system is
presented in Fig. 1. Its key component is the ‘action arena’,
in which participants interact and perform appropriation and
provision activities. Besides the participants (who have access
to resources and information among others), the action arena
also includes action situations where the actual activities (or
‘games’) take place.
The activities in the action arena lead to patterns of interac-
tion and outcomes that can be judged on the basis of evaluative
criteria illustrated on the right side of Fig. 1. The action arena
is influenced by attributes of the physical world (e.g., climate),
the attributes of the community in which the actors/actions are
embedded (e.g., demographics, shared beliefs), and the set of
rules that govern actor behaviour. The rules of the game (i.e.,
the institutions) are a major influence actual on the structure of
behaviours and interactions. Therefore, in the IAD framework
much attention is given to institutions, which are structured
using the ADICO grammar of institutions [3], [13].
C. The ADICO Grammar of Institutions
ADICO structures institutional statements into five com-
ponents: Attributes, Deontic, aIm, Condition, and sanction
(Or else). This structure summarizes institutional statements,
facilitating the understanding of the formation and evolution
of institutions [13].
a) Attributes: Attributes describe the participants in the
situation to whom the institutional statement applies. For
example, an attribute of an ADICO can be a ‘student’.
b) Deontic Type: This components is used to distinguish
between ‘prescriptive’ and ‘non-prescriptive’ statements. De-
ontic operators are obligated, permitted and forbidden. When
an institutional statement has the deontic type ‘obliged’ the
person must perform the action associated to the institution.
For example, “a student is obliged to attend 50% of class
A in order to be able to sit the exam”. On the contrary, for
institutions with the deontic type ‘forbidden’, actors are not
allowed to perform the action associated to the institution. For
example, “a student is not permitted to take a course twice”.
The deontic type ‘permission’ constitutes the action related
to the institution or grant rights to participants with certain
properties to perform an action. For example, “a student with
GPA above 9 is permitted to take more than 100 credits per
semester”.
c) aIm: The aim component describes the action or
outcome to which the institutional statement applies. In order
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Fig. 1. The components of a social system in the IAD framework [16].
for an institution to influence behaviour, individuals must have
a choice concerning its ‘aim’. In other words, prescribing an
action or outcome only makes sense if its negation is also
possible. In the above mentioned examples of institutions,
“take course”, “sit exam” and “take credit” are the aims of
those institutional statements.
d) Condition: Conditions are the set of parameters that
define when and where an ADICO statement applies. If there
is no condition stated, it implies that the statement holds at all
times.
e) Or else: ‘Or else’ is the consequence of non-
compliance to an assigned institutional statement. A common
type of ‘Or else’ is a sanction.
According to the ADICO decomposition, an institutional
statement can be divided into three different categories
namely: rules, norms and shared strategies.
1) ADICO
A Rule is the most complete form of institutional state-
ment, covering all five components of ADICO. In other
words, rules have attribute, deontic type, aim, condition
and ‘or else’.
2) ADIC
A Norm1 is an institutional statement without an explicit
and unique ‘or else’ component.
3) AIC
A Shared strategy is an institutional statement where
there are no sanctions or deontic type. These kind
of statements represent behavioural patterns shared be-
tween individuals in a system.
In our model, as we will explain later, we assume that the
emerging institutions are norms (of the ADIC type) mean-
ing that agents are obliged to comply with the established
institutions but they will not receive an explicit sanction for
non-compliance.
1Referred to as ‘social norm’ or even ‘moral’ or ‘ethic code’ in multi-agent
systems literature.
III. AN ABM OF EMERGING INSTITUTIONS
A. Model Overview
The model is implemented in Netlogo [23]. It takes the
ADICO sequence as a starting point to allow institutions to
emerge and evolve in an abstract CPR system. We use the
ADICO structure in two different ways. First, we assume that
the agents select and follow individual strategies structured
by the ‘A’, ‘I’ and ‘C’ components of ADICO. Strategy
change follows an evolutionary dynamics where unsuccessful
agents copy other agents or randomly explore new possibilities
(mutation).
Second, the ADICO sequence is used to structure the
management institution that affects the behaviour of all agents.
Note that the current model covers only the ‘A’, ‘D’, ‘I’, ‘C’
components of the ADICO structure but has no sanction. This
means that it would be formally more proper to refer to it as a
norm. However, since in the current version all agents comply
with the institution, the distinction is practically irrelevant and
we will continue to talk about “institutions”. Future develop-
ments will include the possibility of rule-breaking for agents
and sanctioning, hence including also the ‘O’ component.
The main feature of the model is that the institution derives
bottom-up from agents’ strategies through a voting system and
can change through time following the evolution of agents’
strategies.
B. Model Components
The model consists of the following components:
• Agents: the agents are nodes in a social network defining
their neighbourhood. The network is defined in two differ-
ent ways: (1) random network, (2) small-world network.
• Resource: there is only one resource that is shared be-
tween agents in the simulation. The agents gain energy
by taking units from the resource. The resource is re-
newable; in each time step it (re)grows at a rate given
by a logistic function with two parameters: the carrying
capacity K and the reproduction rate r, which represents
the maximum proportional increase of the resource in
one time step. The specific function used is a standard
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discrete-time logistic. The increase ∆R of the resource
R at time t is given by:
∆R = rR
(
1− R
K
)
(1)
At the beginning of the simulation the resource is set at
carrying capacity, while it subsequently changes depend-
ing on the amount harvested by agents and on equation
(1).
• ADICO components:
A. The relevant statements apply to the single agent
in case of individual strategies and to all agents
in case of the establishment of an institutional
rule.
D. The deontic is relevant only for the institution
(since it is a rule, not a strategy) and is always
of the ‘obliged’ type, which means that agents
always follow their strategies or the institutional
rule.
I. We assumed that all the actions an agent can
possibly take are stored in a list. These actions
are related to the common resource exploitation.
The actions also influence the amount of energy
the agents gain. For simplicity, we also assumed
that the number of units extracted from the re-
source is equal to the energy gained by the agent.
For example, eat5 implies that the agent gains
5 units of energy, while the resource is decreased
by 5 unit. There is also one action that does not
influence the resource, but reduces the amount of
agent energy (eat-5). This action is included in
the action list to represent possible losses that an
agent may face through inappropriate behaviour
(e.g., fishers losing their boat while trying to fish
during a storm).
C. We assumed that all the conditions an agent
can possibly consider are stored in a list. The
conditions specify when and where the agent is
allowed to perform its selected action. At a given
point in time, each agent has only one action-
condition pair.
O. As written above, we assumed that all agents
follows the rule when an institution is in place.
As a consequence, this component becomes non-
relevant.
• Institution: in the current model, only one institution
at a time can rule the system. This institution, is es-
tablished by a voting system. Throughout the simula-
tion, the institution changes if the number of agents
not performing well (i.e., energy level < 0) is higher
than a certain threshold (Tab. I, threshold for
institutional change). Furthermore, the institu-
tion can only change at certain time intervals given by the
institutional emergence time parameter.
start
Initialize agents & 
resource
Agent: select 
individual strategy
Stop 
simulation
?
Agent: loose energy 
Resource: grow
Agent: exploit 
resource own 
strategy
Institution 
present?
Establish new 
institution
Institutional 
Emergence time 
& Change 
threshold met?
Agent: exploit 
resource,  institution
yes
end
no
no
Energy<0
Choose new 
strategy
yes
no
yes
no
yes
Fig. 2. The simulation procedure
C. Simulation Procedure
The simulation, depicted in the flowchart in Fig. 2, is
described below:
• Model setup:
1) each agent randomly selects a strategy, i.e. a com-
bination of action-condition (AIC);
2) the resource is initialized equal to the carrying
capacity.
• Procedures occurring in every time step:
1) the resource grows as explained above
2) agents loose energy according to the energy
consumption parameter
3) agents gain new energy by exploiting the resource
4) each agent checks its current energy level; if it is
below 0, it chooses a different action-condition com-
bination using one of the following two procedures:
– mutation: with a given probability (Tab. I,
mutation rate), the agent chooses the new
action-condition pair (each one separately and
randomly) as at the beginning of the simulation;
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TABLE I
EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
Parameter Values
actions eat [(n× 2), 1 < n < 10], [-5]
conditions (ticks mod 3) = 0, (ticks mod 2) =
0, energy <= 0, (ticks mod 20) =
0, (ticks mod 250) = 0, true
initial amount of resource (k) 5000 – 20000 (step 10000)
growth rate (r) 0.1 – 0.5 (step 0.2)
number of agents 100
energy-consumption 1 – 10 (step 5)
mutation rate 0.01 – 0.1 (step 0.05)
threshold for institutional
change
0.4. 0.6, 0.8, 1
institutional emergence time 50, 100, 200, 500, 1000
number-of-links 2
rewire-prop 0.05
– copying: the agent chooses the action-condition
of the most successful agent in his neighbour-
hood.
• Institutional change procedures occurring every
institutional emergence time step:
1) If a certain proportion of agents (threshold for
institutional change, Tab. I) has energy
below zero, there is call for institutional change.
The most frequently used action-condition pair is
selected as a new institution. From this point, the
agents must comply with the institution, rather than
performing their own action-condition pairs.
The simulation end after 2000 ticks or when the resource
completely runs out.
D. Simulation Setup
The goal of this preliminary model is to see whether it is
possible to replicate the qualitative dynamics of empirical CPR
systems using an abstract model of institutional emergence
and evolution. More specifically, we compared the outcomes
of the CPR system under the institution and no-institution
conditions. The underlying question is whether the agents
and the resource are better off, when collectively selected
institutions are present.
Tab. I shows the experimental setup, including the values
used for the parameters introduced in the previous section. The
parameter sweep resulted in 3240 runs which were repeated
100 times, which led to a total of 324,000 runs. Half of these
runs allowed an institution to emerge, while the other half
were without this possibility. For each run, the average energy
of the agents, the average amount of resource, and the final
selected institution were recorded.
IV. RESULTS
A. Resource and energy
The introduction of the institution affects positively both the
amount of resource in the system and agents’ energy. This re-
mains true also controlling for the other simulation parameters
(Tab. II and III). All parameters except the mutation rate have
TABLE II
OLS ON THE AMOUNT OF RESOURCE REMAINING AT THE END OF THE
SIMULATION
Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(> |t|)
(intercept) -4626.0191 38.1777 -121.17 0.0000
institution 3516.6743 15.8985 221.20 0.0000
K 0.5148 0.0013 403.87 0.0000
r 14135.1495 46.7691 302.23 0.0000
energy consumption -56.1966 2.1591 -26.03 0.0000
institutional
emergence time
-1.1240 0.0226 -49.71 0.0000
mutation rate 9.6372 215.9067 0.04 0.9644
threshold institutional
change
-3530.4305 35.5500 -99.31 0.0000
R2 0.4966
F (7, 320752) 4.52e+04 0.0000
TABLE III
OLS ON THE AMOUNT OF AGENTS’ ENERGY AT THE END OF THE
SIMULATION
Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(> |t|)
(intercept) -607.8326 16.1403 -37.66 0.0000
institution 58.8458 6.7214 8.76 0.0000
K 0.0915 0.0005 169.87 0.0000
r 3767.1631 19.7725 190.53 0.0000
energy consumption -238.5417 0.9128 -261.33 0.0000
institutional
emergence time
-2.5759 0.0096 -269.47 0.0000
mutation rate -49.3257 91.2786 -0.54 0.5889
threshold institutional
change
-60.1269 15.0294 -4.00 0.0001
R2 0.3913
F (7, 320752) 2.945e+04 0.0000
a significant effect on both dependent variables. The resource
carrying capacity and renewal rate positively affect both the
amount of resource available and the agents’ energy, while
the energy consumption negatively affects them. Especially
interesting is to note that both the institutional emergence time
and the proportion of agents needed to change the institution
negatively affect both indicators, which means that the harder
it is to build the institution the worse is the outcome for both
the agents and the resource.
Although, the agents on average are better off when in-
stitution building is allowed, they do not necessarily reach
an optimal situation. In most cases, the selected institution
actually led to a condition when the available energy was
below what the agents could have theoretically obtained from
the resource; in some cases it was even below the energy
gathered under the same parameter configuration in the no-
institution condition. This is clear in Fig. 3, which shows
the average amount of energy and resource at the end of the
simulation under all the different institutional arrangements
selected by agents.
To simplify the analysis, we selected two examples of
resource condition characterized by difficult resource manage-
ment (low carrying capacity and high energy consumption) and
easier management (high carrying capacity and low energy
consumption) respectively. Note that the extreme abundance
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Fig. 3. Average energy of agents and resource left at the end of the simulation under various institutional arrangements in low and high resource conditions.
Low resource is defined as K = 5000, r = 0.1 and energy.consumption = 10. High resource is defined as K = 20000, r = 0.1 and energy.consumption =
1. The dashed red lines represent the average energy and resource under the same parameter configurations in the no institution condition.
condition (K = 20000, r = 0.5) was not included in
the analysis since the management of the resource under
an open access rule was effective enough and agents never
implemented a stricter institutional rule (see Tab. IV below).
Under all the selected institutions, the state of the resource
at the end of the simulation was instead better than the
no-institution case (Fig. 3). This is quite interesting since
it implies that in no case the agents selected an institution
making them using the resource more than in the open access
situation. It is also worth noting that, under most of the
selected institutional arrangements, the difference between the
open-access and the regulated condition was quite dramatic,
with the resource exploited at low to sustainable levels under
all of the selected institutional arrangements and few signs
of overuse. Especially relevant is the quasi-optimal use of
the resource in the low resource condition, with withdrawal
often approximating the maximum sustainable yield keeping
the resource at intermediate levels under a majority of the
selected institutions.
B. Institutions
On average, agents created an institution 2/3 of the times
when the institutional emergence option was enabled. Notably,
they only succeeded in doing it when the proportion of agents
needed to change the current institution (the threshold for
institutional change parameter) was lower 1. In other words,
under the unanimity rules the process of institutional building
never succeeded. The institutional emergence time parameter
instead only showed a relatively small effect. Finally, the
agents never created an institution when K = 20000 and
r = 0.5, i.e., when the resource was so abundant and rapidly
replenishing that no institution was actually needed to reach
the survival level.
It is interesting to note how agents adapted their institution
to the environment. Tab. IV shows the most common institu-
tion for each combination of K, r and energy consumption.
The amount of energy “eaten” tends to increase with both
the resource availability and the agents’ requirements, while
the modal institution becomes the “open access” one ([”” ””])
for the highest values of K, r, especially under low energy
consumption requirements.
To better analyze the changes in the institution due to
different resource availability, we separated the institutional
rule recorded at the end of the simulation into its aim and
condition statements. Fig. 4 presents the resulting distribution
under both a relatively low and a relatively high resource
availability.
When the resource is scarce, agents tend to select relatively
high withdrawals at distant intervals. This strategy clearly
allow the resource to replenish between two different con-
sumption steps. This said, the relatively even distribution of
different institution visible in the upper row of Fig. 4 testifies
the difficult adaptation of agents to a scarcity situation, where
easy solution is available to have at the same time enough
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Fig. 4. Distribution of the Aim and Condition statements under low and high resource condition. Low resource is defined as K = 5000, r = 0.1 and
energy.consumption = 10. High resource is defined as K = 20000, r = 0.1 and energy.consumption = 1.
energy for all and a resource kept at sustainable levels.
On the contrary, when the resource is abundant, relatively
small but frequent withdrawals are consistently selected. In a
majority of the cases, agents are simply allowed to consume
a small amount of resource either when their energy becomes
zero (condition: “energy ≤ 0”) or even in every time step
(condition: “true”). This allows them to maintain an optima
level of energy without degrading the resource at a level
beyond its renewal capacity.
V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
In this paper we presented a preliminary model based on
the ADICO grammar of institution showing that an institution
emerging through collective behaviour without centralized
planning can help the management of common pool resources.
Consistently with much empirical findings [1], [12], [13],
we found that, in systems where institutional building was
possible, both the agents’ payoffs and the resource condition
improved in comparison with situations where the agents were
only allowed to follow their own strategies.
This result is consistent with the work of Smajgl and
colleagues, who also model rule changes in social systems
using the ADICO structure [20]. While Smajgl considered the
selection of agents actions and global rules as two separate
behavioural mechanisms in the system, we see emerging rules
as ones that are the results of repetitions and commonality
in individual strategies. Furthermore, agent behaviour and
decision making in [20] is defined through internal and
external variables such as incentives, motivation, goals and
environmental conditions.
In the model presented in this paper, agents are simpler
entities, which either randomly choose new behaviours or copy
others. Another distinction between these two researches is
that, while the resource dynamics in [20] only followed simple
rules and presented no inter-temporal links, we explicitly
modelled the resource change over time using prevailing bio-
economics models and studied how these changes influence
the emergence and evolution of rules.
Despite a much higher level of abstraction and the fact that
we took an implicit evolutionary (copying, mutation, etc.) per-
spective, our results remain fully consistent with both Smajgl’s
ones and the ones of commons research [1]. Notably, we were
still able to observe institutional dynamics similar to the ones
found in empirical settings and to confirm that institutions do
indeed contribute to the sustainable management of common
pool resource systems. Especially interesting was the capacity
of agents to adapt their institutions to resource availability.
For instance, the fact that agents selected institutions allowing
them to harvest only at distant intervals of time bears a
clear resemblance with discussions going on during CPR
experiments, where time-based strategies allowing the resource
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TABLE IV
MODAL INSTITUTION FOR EACH COMBINATION OF K , r AND ENERGY
CONSUMPTION
K r energy selected
consumption institution
5000 0.10 1 [” eat 2” ” energy <= 0”]
10000 0.10 1 [” eat 2” ” (ticks mod 2) = 0”]
20000 0.10 1 [” eat 18” ” energy <= 0”]
5000 0.20 1 [” eat 4” ” (ticks mod 3) = 0 ”]
10000 0.20 1 [” eat 2” ” (ticks mod 2) = 0”]
20000 0.20 1 [”” ””]
5000 0.50 1 [” eat 12” ” energy <= 0”]
10000 0.50 1 [”” ””]
20000 0.50 1 [”” ””]
5000 0.10 5 [” eat -5” ” (ticks mod 2) = 0”]
10000 0.10 5 [” eat 12” ” true”]
20000 0.10 5 [” eat 10” ” (ticks mod 2) = 0”]
5000 0.20 5 [” eat 10” ” true”]
10000 0.20 5 [” eat 10” ” (ticks mod 2) = 0”]
20000 0.20 5 [” eat 10” ” energy <= 0”]
5000 0.50 5 [” eat 12” ” (ticks mod 2) = 0”]
10000 0.50 5 [” eat 12” ” true”]
20000 0.50 5 [”” ””]
5000 0.10 10 [” eat 12” ” (ticks mod 2) = 0”]
10000 0.10 10 [” eat 8” ” true”]
20000 0.10 10 [” eat 10” ” (ticks mod 3) = 0 ”]
5000 0.20 10 [” eat 10” ” (ticks mod 2) = 0”]
10000 0.20 10 [” eat 4” ” energy <= 0”]
20000 0.20 10 [” eat 10” ” true”]
5000 0.50 10 [” eat 4” ” true”]
10000 0.50 10 [” eat 16” ” energy <= 0”]
20000 0.50 10 [”” ””]
to replenish were more often discussed and selected under the
most challenging conditions [7].
Finally, it is worth noting that the model discussed in this
paper represents only a starting point in our research on the
mechanisms leading to institutional emergence and that there
are many dimensions that can still be added to the model. First,
as highlighted by Poteete and colleagues [18], although norm
emergence has been studied to some extent, the emergence of
rules is an area of research that requires special attention. By
building a model using the ADICO structure, we focused our
attention to the dynamics (or emergence) of rules. This means
that, to be able to study rules in a more realistic way, we
should at least add cheating and sanctioning mechanisms to
our model. Following Ostrom’s argument about the process of
norms (ADIC statement) evolving into rules (complete ADICO
statements including sanctions), we decided that a reasonable
first step was to allow norms to emerge in the system with
all agents abiding them. Nevertheless, future versions of
the model will allow agents to decide whether they would
comply with the institution or follow their own individual
strategies through simple learning mechanisms. Finally, the
current model allows only one institution to emerge at a time.
In future versions, coexistence of various institutions and their
possible conflicts will also be an interesting area to explore.
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